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Abstract
As an accompaniment to the translation into English of Louis Althusser’s ‘Letter to the Central
Committee of the PCF, March 18th, 1966’, this note provides the historical and theoretical
context necessary to understand Althusser’s ‘anti-humanist’ interventions into French Communist
Party policy decisions during the mid-1960s. Because nowhere else in Althusser’s published
writings do we see as clearly the political stakes involved in his philosophical project, nor the way
in which this project evolved from a ‘theoreticist’ pursuit into a more practical one, the note also
argues that the letter is of importance to Althusser scholars, to historians of Marxist thought, and
to those interested in the relevance of Althusser’s work to contemporary Marxist philosophy.
Keywords
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On 13 March 1966, after three days of deliberation, the Central Committee
of the French Communist Party (PCF) unanimously adopted a ‘Resolution on
Ideological and Cultural Problems’.1 Ostensibly taking as its subject the
relations between the PCF, intellectuals, and culture, this resolution was
viewed by many as the moment when the PCF oﬃcially abandoned its Stalinist
legacy and sought to better integrate itself into French and Western-European
political life.2 To those more interested in French Marxist philosophy than
French Marxist politics, this document is also remembered as the text that
delivered the Party’s statement on the ‘Humanist Controversy’. In this mode,
it served not only as a resolution on the relationship among the PCF, intellectuals,
and culture, but also as a resolution of the debates among Party intellectuals
1. Parti Communiste Français 1966, pp. 265–80.
2. Vigreux 2000, p. 214.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007
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competing to have their revisions to Marxist-Leninist theory adopted as the
PCF’s oﬃcial philosophy.
As prominent intellectuals and PCF Central Committee members, Louis
Aragon and Roger Garaudy both participated in preliminary talks about the
merits of humanist versus anti-humanist philosophies and in the three days of
discussion, writing, and revision that immediately preceded the resolution’s
adoption. Records of these debates clearly indicate that these two intellectuals
had their say, that they were heard, and that their voices informed the ﬁnal
document. However, because he was not, like Aragon and Garaudy, a Central
Committee member, one of the controversy’s principal protagonists was never
heard from directly, and this despite the fact that he had originated the antihumanist position. This intellectual was Louis Althusser.
Though shut out from participating in the series of debates that preceded
the resolution (except by proxy and this only during preliminary discussions),
Louis Althusser followed each exchange quite closely. He did so because he
believed that literally everything was at stake with the resolution. This feeling
about the resolution’s importance was not limited to Althusser, or even to the
intellectuals in competition with him for theoretical hegemony in the Party,
but was widely shared among Central Committee members.3 Party members
who were thoughtful and cared about the future of the PCF recognised this
resolution as the culmination of the long period of introspection occasioned
by Khrushchev’s 1956 ‘Secret Speech’ at the Twentieth Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Long in coming, the
resolution was intended to deﬁne the Party’s post-Stalinist direction.4 At
stake, then, were not only the dynamics among intellectuals, the Party, and
culture, but also the Party’s self-understanding. This was true in terms of its
philosophy and with regard to its place in the domestic and international
political landscape.
With no direct access to the Central Committee as it met for three days in
the Parisian suburb of Argenteuil to draft the resolution, Althusser was placed
in a reactive position. When the document appeared in Party daily L’Humanité
on 15 March and Althusser discovered that, in the main, it did not include his
anti-humanist position, he had basically two options. Given his position at the
École Normale Supérieure (ENS), the ﬁrst was to respond as an academic
philosopher, authoring articles and books elucidating his anti-humanist
Marxism and, thereby, indirectly demonstrating that the Party that claimed to
be the instantiation of Marxist philosophy misunderstood this very philosophy.
3. Sève 2000, p. 66.
4. Sève 2000, p. 67.
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Indeed, there is evidence that Althusser took this approach, seeking in work
intended for publication to better support his arguments such that, eventually,
everyone – including the Central Committee – would be won over to his
understanding of Marxism. Most of this work went unpublished during
Althusser’s lifetime.5
Given his status as public intellectual and party member, the second option
open to Althusser was to respond to the Central Committee directly. No
doubt, this alternative might have had a more immediate eﬀect than the other
option, and it was pursued by Althusser – albeit in an even more abortive
fashion than his attempts at academic refutation. Having carefully read the
resolution as well as seemingly every published intervention [position paper]
delivered by committee members during the Argenteuil discussions,6 Althusser
took great pains to draft a letter to the Central Committee registering his
objections to the resolution. In this letter, he sought to reveal its primary
contradiction and to make plain its numerous theoretical errors. In addition,
he attempted to indicate how the theoretical mistakes made in the resolution
would lead the Party to tactical errors. Unlike the work intended for academic
audiences, which did, in part, see the light of day, and had some eﬀect on
academic Marxist theory, this letter was probably never sent and it never found
its audience.7
Whether the excuse for not sending his missive was depression, cowardice,
or Althusser’s habitual invocation of ‘the conjuncture’, this dispatch was and
remains a document of some importance to Althusser scholars, to historians of
Marxist thought, and to those interested in the relevance of Althusser’s work
to Marxist philosophy today. In this letter, and in the course of ‘correcting’ the
Party’s incorrect theses on the proper reading of Marx, Althusser states quite
clearly his position on the way in which Marx must be read if one wishes to
5. The bulk of Althusser’s work in this regard has been translated and published posthumously
as ‘The Humanist Controversy’ in Althusser 2003, pp. 221–307. A small part of this text was
excerpted by Althusser for the essay titled ‘Sur le rapport de Marx à Hegel’ that appeared in
Althusser 1972. This was the only part of Althusser’s eﬀorts to clarify his anti-humanist position
to see publication during his lifetime.
6. These published interventions and Althusser’s marginal notes on them are preserved in his
archive, see: ALT2.A43-04.04, Fonds Althusser, Institut Mémoire de l’Édition Contemporaine,
Paris, France.
7. In writing this note, ten primary and eight secondary accounts of the humanist controversy
were reviewed. Three of these secondary accounts consulted PCF archives. Not one mentions the
Central Committee as having received this letter. All, however, remark on the centrality of
Althusser’s position in the debates and it is relatively certain that, had such a letter been sent, it
would have been discussed. In his correspondence from the time and in his recollections of the
controversy afterwards, Althusser mentions writing the letter but does not mention having sent
it or having received a response.
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avoid a return to Stalinism or a politically hazardous detour into humanist
Marxism. Of course, this hermeneutic strategy is developed elsewhere by
Althusser and in a more sophisticated way. However, nowhere in his published
writings do we see as clearly the political stakes involved in Althusser’s
philosophical project, nor can we see the way in which this project evolved
from a ‘theoreticist’ project into a more practical one. As G.M. Goshgarian
notes in his introduction to The Humanist Controversy, Althusser’s dealings
with the Party between 1966–7 were crucial to the development of his
thought.8 Written in 1966, when Althusser was perhaps most involved with
trying to re-direct the Party, this document represents a crucial link between
the Althusser of Reading ‘Capital’ and the Althusser of Lenin and Philosophy.
Inasmuch as, with this text, we see an example of philosophy working to
criticise and challenge ideological notions about the world and thereby to
inform political practice, it can also be seen to perform that function which
Althusser will claim, in the writings recently compiled as Philosophy of the
Encounter, to be the proper role of materialist philosophy.9 To the extent that
it does this, it allows us to see how such engaged theory might function today.
As it was written in response to a speciﬁc resolution, at a speciﬁc moment,
and from a speciﬁc place, one cannot read this letter as pure political philosophy.
Yes, Althusser does opine in it about the nature of the political world, about
the ‘essence’ of man, and about the diﬀerence between truth and ideology.
However, he also writes about how Marxist principles and concepts demand a
speciﬁc course of action, at a particular historical moment, and in a particular
place. While these concerns certainly make the letter of more than philosophical
interest, they also make it harder to engage with its ideas. Especially as the
moment that Althusser sought to intervene into is, today, rather remote, before
we identify the speciﬁc theoretical positions that inform the resolution it is
probably best to review what was at stake in its adoption. Having accomplished
this, it should then be possible to consider Althusser’s reaction to the resolution
and to demonstrate how this reaction is informed by the arguments he advanced
in his work from the early 1960s. Finally, this note will show how this reaction
represents an instance of philosophy informing political practice, a move that
Althusser will later champion as the role for philosophy but that is undertaken
here without a conscious understanding of its proper function.
If the debates at Argenteuil and the resolution that resulted from them were
about how the PCF would de-Stalinise, then the Central Committee had
much to consider in this regard. Not only did it have to articulate a new party
8. Goshgarian 2003, pp. xi–xii.
9. Althusser 2006, pp. 231, 287.

HIMA 15,2_f8_132-151.indd 136

5/22/07 1:43:59 PM

W. S. Lewis / Historical Materialism 15 (2007) 133–151

137

philosophy – one which could replace Stalinist ‘diamat’ – but it also had to
think about how any new positions it took would inform and inﬂuence its
political aﬃliations. Domestically, this meant worrying about its connection
not only to the broader French Left but also to that group of which it had
always considered itself to be the representative, the working class. Further
complicating these considerations was the problem of its rapport with an
increasingly important group with which it had historically enjoyed a troubled
relationship, intellectuals. This group had recently been expanded by the PCF
to include not only scientists, academics, artists, and students but also
professionals such as teachers, architects, and engineers.10 Given that these
sub-groups often identiﬁed (or failed to identify) with the PCF for quite
diﬀerent reasons, the range of domestic relationships that the PCF had to
reconsider was dizzying. No less complex were its international aﬃliations.
Though still following Moscow’s lead and desirous of maintaining a close
relationship with the CPSU, Russia’s policy reversals, its squabbles with China,
its treatment of artists and intellectuals, and its unpopular military and
diplomatic actions made it diﬃcult for the French Party to align itself with the
Soviet Union in the way it had done for nearly half a century.
Along with domestic and international relations, also under review at
Argenteuil was the Party’s automatic seconding of Stalin’s interpretation of
Marxist-Leninist philosophy. After 1956, it was no longer an easy task to defend
a theory of history which insisted that the Soviet Union was the historical agent
preordained to lead the world to communism. Nor was it easy to accept this
theory’s corollary, that every national Communist party must unquestionably
support the CPSU’s actions. Also diﬃcult to swallow was the epistemology
promulgated by Stalin and Zhdanov and justiﬁed by the aforementioned
philosophy of history, which insisted on the ideological character of all
proletarian thought and on the infallibility of proletarian knowledge.11 When
the Soviet Union’s claims to be the ultimate exemplar of an enlightened,
egalitarian, free, and prosperous nation were belied by Khrushchev’s speech
and by the Soviet invasion of Hungary, each of these theories – as well as the
distinctions and principles that undergirded them – became suspect.
If Stalinism had become increasingly unpalatable even to long-serving
members of the French Communist Party, then one can only guess at its lack
of appeal to new members and to potential sympathisers. Reform was needed.
Though carried by Stalinist inertia for four years, the PCF did begin in the
early 1960s to consider and debate substantive changes. Still very much tied
10. Santamaria 1999, pp. 74–5; Courtois and Lazar 1995, pp. 323–4.
11. Lewis 2005, pp. 118–27.
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to the Soviets, this reﬂection was encouraged in 1961 by the Twenty-Second
Congress of the CPSU, where the Party announced the end of the dictatorship
of the proletariat and suggested that there were many possible routes to
socialism. This reconsideration was also accelerated in the middle of the decade
by the death of the long-serving French Communist Party General Secretary
Maurice Thorez and by Waldeck Rochet’s assumption of the position in 1964.
In addition to both internal and external pressures to reform and to the
domestic, international, and philosophical concerns detailed above, the PCF
had a bevy of other issues to address with the Argenteuil resolution. Following
some hesitant moves towards aﬃliation that it had begun in 1961,12 by middecade, the PCF leadership had judged that, in a union with the broader Left,
it had a chance of obtaining a parliamentary majority and of instituting
reforms. Further tilting the Party away from international issues, and therefore
away from Moscow, was a change in its economic analysis. No longer did the
PCF hew to a global theory of imperialism. Instead, it was moving to endorse
the theory of ‘state monopoly capitalism’.13 Because this theory focused on the
relationship between French industry and the French state as the nexus of
wealth concentration and as the cause of class division, the importance of
domestic issues in PCF politics was naturally foregrounded.
Though new political possibilities and new economic theses drove the
resolution’s drafters to consider the PCF’s domestic situation in a new light, it
was a queer kind of international relation – one mostly engaged in by dissident
Party members – that drove the Central Committee to reﬂect on matters
philosophical. Because PCF members and potential sympathisers were well
aware of, and often sympathetic to, the possibilities for party constitution and
theoretical reform evidenced by the Chinese and Italian Parties, the PCF’s
long tradition of shadowing every Soviet thought and gesture was thrown into
unﬂattering relief. In an era when the Italian Communist Party had successfully
instituted democratic reforms and when China had embraced a policy of total
cultural reform and renewal, the French Party’s long-standing practice of
democratic centralism and of taking direction exclusively from Moscow
appeared as anachronistic as its insistence that French workers were becoming
increasingly impoverished.14
Despite frequent statements concerning the ‘revisionism’ of the Italians and
against the ‘dogmatism’ of the Chinese, the Party was well aware that these
positions had attracted many of its most dynamic and visible members. Even

12. Adereth 1984, pp. 175–7.
13. Courtois and Lazar 1995, p. 323.
14. Courtois and Lazar 1995, p. 325.
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if they did not have a clear grasp of the theories supporting the accomplishments
of Togliatti and Mao, students at France’s grandes écoles evinced a particular
fascination with these alternative formulations of Marxism-Leninism. As
factions were forming within the PCF between those members who stuck to
the party line and those (mostly students and intellectuals) who looked to
Italian and Chinese models for theoretical inspiration, the French Communist
Party reﬂected dissensions within the international Communist movement.15
By mid-decade, foreign inﬂuences were not the only causes of a philosophical
crisis within the PCF. The discrediting of Stalinist diamat as well as the opening of
party theoretical journals and presses to multiple perspectives at the beginning
of the 1960s allowed a limited plurality of alternatives to Stalin’s interpretation
of Marxist-Leninist philosophy to be aired and debated. Sometimes, these
revisions lined up with foreign theories, sometimes they did not. For instance,
Garaudy’s humanism was occasionally labelled ‘Italian’ while Althusser’s antihumanism was often decried as ‘Chinese’ or ‘Maoist’. Even when they did not
follow foreign patterns, these alternatives were identiﬁed by the Party leadership
as either ‘dogmatist’ or ‘revisionist’ and criticised for their separation of theory
from practice.16 Despite the PCF’s initial reaction to these new interpretations
of Marxism, it was apparent by the early 1960s that the Party needed openly
to repudiate diamat and to endorse an alternative if it wanted to attract and
retain those members who thought philosophy to be important for the
Communist movement. For the most part, these were intellectuals.
Recognising this need for philosophical reform, the party press Éditions
Sociales released a new summary of Marxist philosophy in 1962.17 This oﬃcial
statement, however, did not quell debate. Soon after its release, the party
leadership found itself faced with the need to make a choice between the
various ‘dogmatist’ and ‘revisionist’ philosophies being aired by prominent
intellectuals associated with the Party. After a period that included incredibly
well-attended public debates as well as more intimate discussions between
party philosophers, progressive theologians, and non-party left intellectuals,18
the Party settled on Garaudy’s socialist humanism as its oﬃcial philosophy
and on Garaudy as its party philosopher.19 Militating against this settlement
of opinion, though, were two tensions within the Party. One was caused by
students and intellectuals desirous of revisions that were more radical and

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Bowd 1999, pp. 53–4.
Bowd 1999, pp. 48, 58–9.
Rochet 1962.
Besse 2000, p. 33.
Bowd 1999, p. 52.
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more philosophically substantive than Garaudy was prepared to oﬀer.20 Another
challenge to the oﬃcial approbation of Garaudy’s humanism was the party
leadership’s own workerist bias. This bias tended to reinforce the view that,
despite being founded and led by intellectuals in the early twentieth century,
the Party did not need these ﬁgures now because the Party was itself a type of
‘collective intellectual that brings socialism to the working class and to the
people’.21 Being its own organic intellectual, the Party did not need bourgeois
professors or poets to tell it what to think or what to do.
When, in May 1964, Waldeck Rochet formally resurrected the idea of a
Union of the Left at the PCF’s Seventeenth Congress, the unsettled state of
the Party’s philosophy became a practical problem. As the Socialists and other
left parties had been burned many times before by a PCF whose allegiance to
the Soviet Union and to international Communism came before any domestic
union, they needed abundant reassurance that the Communists had changed.
Garaudy’s ethic of dialogue and his philosophy of socialist humanism probably
went a long way towards mending theoretical and political fences. Nevertheless,
there was still the Party’s workerist bias to contend with, as well as the pressure
on the Party by intellectuals for more radical and substantive revisions (as well
as for ones more in keeping with its traditions). The force of these tensions was
certainly felt at the series of discussions on culture and class that followed the
Seventeenth Congress.22 Also, and perhaps more prominently, the tension
among intellectuals was evidenced in the Party’s leading theoretical journal, La
Nouvelle Critique, where thinkers espousing the humanist position debated
those defending anti-humanism.23 Further disturbing the Party’s attempt to
present a uniﬁed, predictable, and benign face to the broader Left was the
publication in autumn 1965 of Louis Althusser’s books For Marx and Reading
‘Capital’. Though published by a ‘dissident’ press, these books were written by
a somewhat prominent party member and they seemed to attack many of the
ideals and principles held dear by socialists and other humanists.
Sensing the need for the PCF to resolve these issues if it wanted to move
forward with a politics of unity, Waldeck Rochet organised a meeting of party
philosophers to discuss the Party’s (theoretical) identity problem. Held at
Choisy-le-Roi in January 1966, these discussions had the goal of ‘testing,
through the exchange of many perspectives, theoretical questions currently
being debated by communist philosophers and the setting out of the conditions
20. Sève 2000, pp. 63–4.
21. Maurice Thorez as quoted in Juquin 2000, p. 80. My translation.
22. Juquin 2000, pp. 81–2.
23. See La Nouvelle Critique 164 (May 1965); as well as Matonti 2005, pp. 71–5; Bowd
1999, p. 61; Juquin 2000, pp. 81–5.
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for the collective work in which each comrade can bring his particular
contribution’.24 Remembered by participants as extremely tense,25 discussion
focused on the relative merits of Garaudy’s argument in De l’anathème au
dialogue (1965) as against Althusser’s arguments in For Marx and Reading
‘Capital’. 26 As one of the meeting’s most vocal participants, Garaudy viciously
attacked Althusser’s reading of Marx. Sick with a nervous malady, Althusser
did not attend the meeting. However, his position was defended by Michel
Verret who also took the time to read from a text that Althusser had previously
circulated among his students.27 Hearing from ally and meeting participant
Pierre Macherey that the garaudistes were apparently on the defensive and that
they had attacked his position with ‘violence, bad faith, and idiocies’, Althusser
was hopeful after Choisy-le-Roi that his anti-humanist philosophy would win
the day.28 Therefore, in the weeks leading up to the conference at Argenteuil,
he was optimistic about what the document eventually issued as ‘Resolution
on Ideological and Cultural Problems’ would contain.
As at Choisy, discussions at Argenteuil were disputatious and full of emotion.
Charged with composing a resolution that would take up no more than one page
in L’Humanité and that was readable by everyone, a committee of ﬁve meeting
under the direction of Louis Aragon ﬁrst listened to the interventions of various
Central Committee members and then went to work.29 As these interventions
have been preserved, it is possible to match-up the substance of each with the
contents of the ﬁnal document and to determine whose thoughts manifest
themselves in the ﬁnal document and to what extent.30 It is apparent from even a
cursory glance that the positions of Louis Aragon and Roger Garaudy comprise
the document’s theoretical core and take up much of its length. This preliminary
judgement as to the extent and importance of Aragon’s and Garaudy’s contributions
is conﬁrmed by ﬁrst-hand accounts of the meetings.31

24. Suret-Canale 2000, p. 125. My translation.
25. Lucien Sève as quoted by François Matheron in Matheron 2000, p. 171.
26. Matheron 2000, p. 170; Geerlandt 1978, p. 30.
27. This text appeared in English as ‘Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation:
Ideology and Ideological Struggle’ in Althusser 1990, pp. 1–43.
28. Matheron 2000, p. 172.
29. Besse 2000, pp. 40–2.
30. Edited oﬃcial transcripts of these interventions appeared in Cahiers du communisme, 5–6
(May–June 1966): 9–263. Unexpurgated tape recordings of these interventions are retained in
the PCF archives and, in at least one case, the trouble has been taken to compare the original to
its oﬃcial version. For this comparison, see Léo Figuères, ‘Aragon et la resolution du Comité
central d’Argenteuil’, and Aragon 2000, pp. 135–52.
31. One of the chief sources for this note, Les Annales de la Société des amis de Louis Aragon et
Elsa Triolet, 2, includes a half-dozen such accounts.
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In charge of the document’s drafting as well as a member of the Central
Committee and the Political Bureau, Louis Aragon was perhaps in the best
position to inﬂuence the resolution. That he was widely celebrated in France
for his literary work and was a conﬁdant of both Maurice Thorez and Waldeck
Rochet could only have ampliﬁed his voice at Argenteuil.32 As resolutely
anti-Stalinist as anyone else on the Central Committee and as committed to
the Party, Aragon desired a resolution expressive of a theory that supported a
strong, united organisation but which would avoid the dogmatism, rigidity,
and exclusivity that Stalin’s theory demanded.33 Because he believed that
culture is advanced by scientists and artists, he also wanted to see the document
state that intellectuals are as essential to the revolution as the proletariat. Given
the importance he attributed to ‘intellectual workers’, he was also particularly
concerned about their status in the Party and their freedom to pursue research.
Despite this concern, Aragon also maintained that the need for political
expediency trumped every other demand, including that of freedom of research.34
Each of these ideas shows up in the completed resolution, some implicitly, others
explicitly. However, insofar as each of these opinions reveal themselves in the
resolution’s repeated references to man as creator, none is quite so explicit as
Aragon’s idea of the link between cultural achievement and revolution.
Having a rather low opinion of philosophical speculation, Aragon’s ‘philosophy’
was derived more from sentiment than from rational argument.35 This view of
philosophy as well as his beliefs about the role of the Party and the status of
culture would obviously pitch Aragon against someone like Althusser, who
thought that philosophy or ‘theory’ was the most important thing for the
Party and who doubted that ‘culture’ could do anything more than reproduce
itself.36 Therefore, it is not surprising that Aragon attacked Althusser’s
philosophy both during his intervention at Argenteuil and in a letter sent to
Waldeck Rochet two months before the meeting.37 The attacks bear more than
a passing resemblance to the charges Meletus levelled at Socrates. Repeating
the accusations of ‘corrupting the youth’ and of ‘impiety’, Aragon chastised
Althusser for his encouragement of ‘Maoist’ students at the ENS and for
insisting on the importance of philosophical ideals over against the demands
of political facts38 – not crimes against the city but against the Party. Aragon
32. Juquin 2000, p. 87.
33. Juquin, 2000, pp. 87–9.
34. Louis Aragon in a letter to Waldeck Rochet quoted by Juquin 2000, p. 100, (see also
pp. 87, 98).
35. Bowd 1999, p. 64.
36. Aragon 2000, pp. 135–6.
37. Aragon 2000, pp. 131–4.
38. Juquin 2000, pp. 100–2.
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believed that Althusser’s philosophy weakened the PCF politically and he
argued that Althusser’s emphasis on the importance of theory would result in
the Party’s domination by a ‘technocratic-theoretical’ élite.39 He alleged as well
that the PCF’s politics – especially its politics of unity – would suﬀer from this
domination.
While Aragon was perhaps at the peak of his inﬂuence in 1966, Garaudy’s
was on the wane. Were it not for Althusser’s challenge to his socialist humanism,
a Party that had grown less and less enthusiastic about his philosophical
concessions to the Socialists and to the Christian Left might have already
marginalised Garaudy.40 Althusser’s theoretical intervention, however, provided
Garaudy with a new platform for his humanism. This renewed prominence
permitted him to play a substantial role in the discussions at Argenteuil and
Choisy. While never enamoured with his humanist philosophy, Aragon sought
an alliance with Garaudy during the debates in order to create a block that would
resist not only Althusser’s anti-humanist theory but also any retrenchment by
the Party in Stalinist orthodoxy. Given the Party’s inertia, this retrenchment
looked all too easy for it to carry out.41 By teaming up with Garaudy and other
‘humanists’, Aragon was able to argue more eﬀectively for his vision of ‘socialism
with a human face’ and to push de-Stalinisation to its limits.42
Because Garaudy’s humanist philosophy ﬁtted well with Aragon’s estimation
of the vast creative powers of the human spirit, this alliance proved to be a
strong one. Though Garaudy was by 1966 no longer the ‘party philosopher’,
he still sat on the Central Committee and was director of the Centre d’Études
et de Recherches Marxistes. While the former position gave him access to PCF
leadership, the latter gave him oversight of the Party’s theoretical journals. As
fervent an anti-Stalinist as he was once a Stalinist,43 Garaudy had for years
been arguing for increased philosophical pluralism within the Party and for
opening up the PCF theoretically and politically to outside inﬂuences. In
contrast to Aragon’s positions, these ideas were philosophically supported.
Having wholeheartedly embraced Marx’s early work as his true philosophy,
Garaudy developed a humanist Marxism that made use of notions he found in
works like the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’ (1843)
and The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 such as ‘species being’,
‘alienation’, ‘disalienation’, and ‘whole man’.44 With these notions, Garaudy
39. Bowd 1999, pp. 59, 61.
40. Sève 2000, p. 64.
41. Sève 2000, pp. 69, 70.
42. Juquin 2000, pp. 88, 91.
43. For an example of Garaudy’s Stalinist phase see Garaudy 1948, p. 31. For an example of
the about-face turn to anti-Stalinism, see Garaudy 1960.
44. See G.M. Goshgarian’s endnote to Althusser 2003, p. 219, n. 10.
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constructed a philosophical anthropology in which man is described as being
in the process of overcoming his alienation through acts of self-creation. To
this philosophy of history, Garaudy added an epistemology which he intended
to function as an alternative to Stalin’s theory of knowledge. Thus, rather than
maintaining with Stalin and Zhdanov that only the proletariat held true
knowledge about the world, Garaudy argued that all classes and all peoples
potentially possess knowledge that may be useful to humanity in its struggle
to overcome alienation. In addition, he speciﬁed that the way to access this
knowledge and to make use of it practically was through dialogue and collective
action.45 Though Garaudy’s philosophy does not come across in the document
as explicitly as do Aragon’s positions, it is quite visible in the resolution’s
endorsement of humanism, in its frequent mention of the ‘whole man’, and in
its calls for the pursuit of socialist goals by diverse paths.
In contrast to his own humanism as well as to the Stalinist tradition of
economism, Garaudy viewed Althusser’s Marxism as an ‘aberration’.46 Like
Aragon, he believed that Althusser put far too much emphasis on the importance
of theory. Garaudy was especially outraged by Althusser’s hierarchisation of
practices, a ranking that put philosophy on top as the ‘theory of theoretical
practices’ and which subsumed politics beneath it. As for the gambit that
followed from this hierarchisation, namely, to have theorists lead the Party,47
Garaudy saw it as a deliberate attempt on Althusser’s part to reject the ‘criterion
of practice’ and publicly chastised him for this mistake, reminding the wayward
professor that ‘the fundamental responsibility for every Communist is neither
theoretical nor scientiﬁc, it his responsibility with regard to the Party’.48
Given Althusser’s absence during the resolution’s drafting and considering
Garaudy’s and Aragon’s dominance of the meeting at Argenteuil, it is a bit of
a surprise that Althusser’s positions make any appearance at all in the completed
document. The wide dissemination of his arguments, his status with young
intellectuals, his wider prestige, and the fact that – in at least one respect – his
goals for party reform were not incompatible with Aragon’s were enough,
however, to ensure that Althusser enjoyed some support on the Committee
and that some of his ideas were present in the document.49 This inﬂuence is
evident where the resolution seconds Althusser’s understanding of historical
and dialectical materialism with its statement that Marxism is founded on a
45. Grellard 2000, pp. 190–4.
46. Matheron 2000, p. 171.
47. Goshgarian 2003, pp. xi–xii.
48. Roger Garaudy as quoted in Matheron 2000, p. 171. My translation.
49. See especially the intervention of Michel Simon 1966, pp.109–35. Simon’s comments on
why he was not even more supportive of Althusser’s position appear in Matonti 2005, p. 105.

HIMA 15,2_f8_132-151.indd 144

5/22/07 1:44:01 PM

W. S. Lewis / Historical Materialism 15 (2007) 133–151

145

‘rigorously scientiﬁc conception of the world’. It is also evident in its declaration
that ‘incumbent on Marxist-Leninist parties is the responsibility for theory’.50
With Althusser being as hostile to Zhdanovism as Aragon, his understanding
of historical materialism also comes through in the resolution’s calls for
freedom of scientiﬁc research. Indeed, it is on this position where the sentiments
of the maître à penser and the grand écrivain are most in accord (though for
diﬀerent reasons).
As with every other Althusserian position that found its way into the
document, surrounding statements weaken the full impact of this call for
freedom of research. For example, the resolution’s unwillingness to distinguish
scientiﬁc from artistic pursuits blunts Althusser’s call for a social-scientiﬁc
research agenda that might come to direct party action. Likewise, whereas
Althusser would have insisted that those most capable of discharging the
Party’s ‘responsibility for theory’ are professional theorists, the ﬁnal document
distorts this position (and evidences the Party’s workerist bias) with the
speciﬁcation that theory is the responsibility ‘of intellectuals just as much as it
is of workers and peasants’.51 Finally, in the most glaring instance of the erosion
of Althusser’s platform, the resolution precedes its declaration that Marxism is
an objective science by an aﬃrmation that Marxism is a type of humanism.
For Althusser the anti-humanist, Marxism’s scientiﬁc status means that it
cannot make use of pre-scientiﬁc, ideological, or mystical notions like ‘human
being’, ‘human essence’, and ‘humanity’s goal’. It is the repeated modiﬁcation
of his philosophical positions, such as the combination of scientiﬁc concepts
with ideological ones, that appears to have really set Althusser oﬀ when he ﬁrst
read the resolution. As it contains in germ most of the arguments that he
made in the ﬁnished letter to the Central Committee presented here, a note
that he wrote to the Cercle Politzer (his Marxist study group at the ENS)
probably best represents Althusser’s ﬁrst reaction to the resolution. The analysis
is very harsh in tone and pulls no punches in its criticism of the Central
Committee for its ‘theoretical compromise’, for its endorsement of ‘spiritualism’,
and for its failure to admonish Garaudy suﬃciently’,52 Though much lengthier
and not nearly so devoid of politesse as the note to the Cercle Politzer, the ﬁrst
draft of Althusser’s letter to the Central Committee diﬀers little in content and
tone. However, now added to the memo’s criticisms of Garaudy and its charge
of theoretical compromise are personal pleas for consideration, extended
exegeses of the resolution’s main points, and references to canonical Marxist

50. Parti Communiste Français 1966, pp. 273, 277–8.
51. Parti Communiste Français 1966, p. 278.
52. Althusser 1966.
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texts. Also added is a healthy dose of sarcasm. Though, after three additional
drafts, it is much reﬁned and augmented, this initial draft’s agreements,
exegeses, and earnestness also characterise the completed letter. Largely missing
from this ﬁfth and ﬁnal draft, however, are the personal pleas and the sarcastic
tone that mark the initial attempt. From a comparison of all the drafts, the
seriousness with which Althusser took his response is everywhere manifest.
From draft to draft, each emendation and change is designed to make his
arguments more clear and – by means of politesse – more palatable to members
of the Central Committee.53
Like an instructor in the Party school’s (and, maybe, like a scholastic
philosopher citing Holy Scripture), Althusser refers throughout the letter to
the founders of Marxism-Leninism as authority. In this mode, he repeatedly
appeals to accepted Marxist-Leninist laws and principles, recalling the Central
Committee to them and pointing out the contradictions with the laws that
the resolution contains. The bulk of his arguments start from the premise that
Marx, Engels, and Lenin have given the Communist Party revelations about
the nature of the world that need be preserved in their purity if the Party is to
achieve its goals. Appealing as it does to the Party’s traditions as well as to its
well-inculcated self-understanding, this is probably a wise rhetorical strategy
(and one that Althusser had great diﬃculty weaning himself away from). In
itself, however, it would never be suﬃcient to argue for and encourage the
departure from Stalinism that is ostensibly Althusser’s goal. This is especially
the case as so much of this understanding of Marx, Engels, and Lenin seems
indebted to Stalin’s Foundations of Leninism.54 So, like a good scholastic
philosopher (but not like most party philosophy instructors), Althusser
constructs out of these authoritative sources an original interpretation of Marx
that resists Stalinist tendencies and reveals the Garaudian and Aragonian
understandings of Marxism that dominate the resolution to be theoretically
and politically misguided.

53. Apparently added as well is a false dateline, 18 March. The letter may have been pre-dated
by Althusser so as to indicate to the Central Committee the seriousness with which he took the
resolution or it may simply indicate the day that he started to compose the letter. Given both the
number and extent of revisions as well as the existence of a note by Althusser to Franca Madonia
from 21 March indicating that the letter was still in preparation (Althusser 1998, p. 664), it is
probable that Althusser took at least a week to revise and amend the various drafts. For more on
the letter’s drafting see Matheron 2000, p. 176.
54. As Gregory Elliott makes clear in the chapter ‘Questions of Stalinism’ from Althusser: The
Detour of Theory, Althusser’s relationship to Stalin’s theory and to Stalinism is complex and often
contradictory. As late as 1969, and long after he had ﬁrst publicly criticised Stalinism, Althusser
still sometimes referred favourably to Stalin’s theory. See Elliott 1987, pp. 268–70.
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Of course, persuasively arguing that true Marxism is and always has been
anti-humanist and that anti-humanism is not a Stalinist position is possible
only if one ignores the many humanist elements present in Marx’s and Engels’s
texts as well as in the PCF’s history.55 Aware of these traditions and perhaps
anticipating this counter-argument, Althusser does not content himself with
selectively citing Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Rather, he uses the arguments that
he developed in For Marx and Reading ‘Capital’ in order to demonstrate that
the resolution makes numerous theoretical errors. The most obvious example
of this mobilisation of philosophy is Althusser’s juxtaposition of the resolution’s
aﬃrmation of the necessity of free research with the declaration that ‘there is a
Marxist humanism’.56 As he points out to the Committee almost ad nauseam,
this declaration prematurely resolves the controversy about whether ‘the
human’ is a scientiﬁc or ideological concept. Subtler than the highlighting of
this error are the ways in which Althusser deploys his theory of Marxist
concepts in order to unmask the ideological notions endorsed by the resolution.
Also less obvious, but no less a part of the letter’s argument is its use of the
schema that Althusser developed in Reading ‘Capital’, which speciﬁed that
philosophy is its own practice and that it must not be contaminated with
ideology. Every reader of Althusser will also notice where the theory of the
‘break’ between the young Marx and the mature Marx serves to advance his
contention that dialectical materialism is in no way a spiritualism and that
historical materialism is a science.
The combined force of these contentions is intended to suggest to the
Central Committee an alternative to Stalinism that – unlike the resolution’s
alternative – is not revisionist. In lieu of embracing humanist values and
celebrating ‘creators’, Althusser argues in the letter that the correct path can
only be found by giving theory its due, by being scientiﬁc, and by paying
attention to the words, actions, and even the silences of Marx. Therefore, in
addition to insisting that the words Marxists use correspond to their theory
and that the Party should maintain a specialised scientiﬁc vocabulary, he
reminds the Central Committee of the importance that Lenin always gave to
theory and the rights that Marx and Engels had already accorded it at the
Gotha Unity Congress. As yet another antidote to revisionism, Althusser
55. The PCF’s humanist impulses were particularly evident immediately following World
War II and during the Front National. They were also present at the party’s founding in the early
1920s by idealists such as Romain Rolland and Boris Souvarine. Though one does not have to
make as strong a claim for Marx’s humanism as does John Roche in his recent article ‘Marx and
Humanism’ (Roche 2005, pp. 335–48), few would dispute the claim that there are humanistic
elements present throughout Marx’s and Engels’s œuvre.
56. Parti Communiste Français 1966, pp. 273, 280.
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warns that the resolution’s over-valuing of art and culture will fatally
compromise its ability to understand the world and direct the revolution. That
is because this embrace of art and culture stems from and leads to a vast
overestimation of the role that ‘creators’ play in the revolutionary process.
In each draft of the letter to the Central Committee, Althusser states his
belief that a compromise has been struck with Garaudy and Aragon and he
warns that this theoretical concession will compromise the Party’s attempts at
reformation. In this initial judgment of the resolution, Althusser was in
agreement with many other concerned observers. Subsequently, most
commentators on the resolution have aﬃrmed this opinion and have added
the retrospective judgment that, though the resolution may have allowed the
Party to retain more intellectuals, its overall eﬀect was to limit reforms, to
reinforce the leadership’s clout, and to limit the inﬂuence of scientiﬁc research
on party policy.57
While Althusser probably never mailed his letter of objection to the resolution,
he did get a chance during the summer of 1966 to make its arguments to the
person then most capable of registering it, Waldeck Rochet.58 The fact that
this audience occurred demonstrates that Althusser did have a voice in the
Party. However, if the meaning of words lies in their eﬀects, then one can say
that the Central Committee never ‘got’ the letter and that Rochet was not
persuaded by his conversation with Althusser.59 Certainly, neither communication
convinced the PCF to prioritise theory and respect scientiﬁc research.
Despite never having its intended eﬀect on the French Communist Party,
the writing of this letter and the formulation of its arguments did aﬀect
Althusser. While perhaps not conscious of how it would do so when he wrote
the letter, the missive strives to oﬀer a critique that may ‘assist in the
transformation of the world’.60 Though, in March 1966, Althusser believed
philosophy’s role to be much greater,61 he would later identify this function as
philosophy’s actual role. Eventually, through the process of formulating
57. For critics who view the resolution as a compromise and for more on the extent of its
eﬀects see: Bowd 1999, pp. 63, 66n, 67; Geerlandt 1978, p. 132; Juquin 2000, pp. 108–13;
Matonti 2005, pp. 107–9; Matheron 2000, p. 169; Olivera and Pudal 2000, p. 264; Sève 2000,
p. 71; Vargas 2000, pp. 246–7; Vigreux 2000, pp. 214–15.
58. In his droll account of the interview with Rochet, Althusser almost cites verbatim the
letter’s argument. See Althusser 2000, pp. 182–3.
59. An indication of Rochet’s attitude towards Althusser is to be found in his summary
discourse at Argenteuil where the General Secretary indirectly reproaches Althusser for ‘separating
Marxist theory from Marxist practice’ and for doing theoretical work that is ‘too abstract’ (Rochet
as quoted in Vigreux 2000, p. 213).
60. Althusser 1971, p. 68.
61. Althusser 1993, p. 171.
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materialist arguments about the nature of the world and observing these
arguments’ eﬀects, Althusser came to revise his original estimation of philosophy’s
worth. He also began to assign to it the role just mentioned.62 Read as an
instance of this type of criticism and not in the way Althusser originally
intended it to be read (that is, as Marx’s true philosophy unmasking its would
be revisionists), the letter clearly appears as a philosophical argument designed
to push the Party away from Stalinism on the one hand and humanism on the
other. As this and subsequent attempts by Althusser to encourage party reforms
largely failed or remained uncompleted,63 it cannot be said that he learned of
this function for philosophy solely from the Party’s positive reaction to his
arguments. However, the Party’s lack of response to his eﬀorts at theoretical
reform certainly taught him not to overestimate philosophy’s power.
That this lesson stuck with him is not only evidenced by Althusser’s
argument from the late 1970s and mid-1980s that philosophy works ‘by way
of ideologies on real, concrete practices’ in order to change these practices;64 it
is also demonstrated in the account of his philosophical development from his
autobiography L’Avenir dure longtemps. Here, Althusser reiterates his argument
against the resolution and recalls his failure to get Rochet to admit the importance
for communist practice of theory and of clear scientiﬁc concepts.65 In this new
telling of the events around the resolution, he also notes that any possible
inﬂuence that this 1966 interview may have had was not due to the fact that
he had presented strong philosophical arguments that the Party was unable to
refute. Instead, the possibility of inﬂuencing the Party existed because the
arguments he made in the early 1960s in theoretical journals had persuaded a
number of students and other intellectuals that anti-humanism was a viable
theoretical option for the Party.66 In 1966, the Central Committee and Rochet
had to respond to Althusser, but not because of his arguments’ rigour and
strength. Rather, they had to listen to him and partly to incorporate his views
because his arguments had created a faction that the Party wished to retain.
This retrospective realisation by Althusser’s of the actual role that philosophy
plays in the world does not vitiate the philosophical importance of the
arguments contained in this letter to the Central Committee. Though this is
not the only place these arguments were made67 and though he later abandoned
62. Matheron 2000, p. 179; Goshgarian 2003.
63. Goshgarian 2003, p. xi.
64. Althusser 1994, p. 170; Althusser 2006, p. 280.
65. Althusser 1993, pp. 197–8.
66. Althusser 1993, p. 198.
67. See Althusser 2003, especially ‘The Philosophical Conjuncture and Marxist Theoretical
Research’, pp. 1–19.
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some of its claims (most notably those on the status of philosophy), he also
developed ideas from the letter on scientiﬁcity and on the role that ideology
plays in culture into constitutive parts of his philosophy. In addition to its
philosophical value, the manner in which the letter demonstrates that
Althusser’s work between 1960 and 1965 was no mere scholastic exercise
makes it into an important document of intellectual history. Contrary to
the caricature of Althusser’s work of the early to mid-1960s – which portrays
it as the hermetic exercises of an academic philosopher intent on developing
a Marxism incorporating fashinable psychoanalytic, anthropological, and
hermeneutic theories – this letter reveals the way in which the arguments
Althusser made during this period were intended to have a political eﬀect.
Indeed, it demonstrates this even if Althusser himself was not then fully
conscious of how philosophy produces such eﬀects.
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